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Abstract 
This paper discusses creativity, continuity and discontinuity in science and in art by 
drawing parallels between Kuhn and Gombrich.  It seeks to show that, while the idea of 
strict cumulative progress in the history of science, as well as in the history of art, was 
abandoned as a new historiography emerged that was sensitive to ruptures, this does not 
imply denial of all continuity.  However, continuity in this context is not a mere logical 
continuity, but rather a more complex theoretical and historical relation.   
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discontinuity. 
 
1. Introduction 
The question of creativity, continuity and discontinuity, which I intend to address 
here, is concisely expressed in Gauguin´s boutade, cited by Francis Haskell at the 
beginning of his article “Enemies of modern art”: “the curious and mad public (...) demands 
of the painter the greatest possible originality and yet only accepts him when he calls to 
mind other painters”.1  
Along similar lines, Gombrich writes in The Story of Art: 
The general public has settled down to the notion that an artist is a fellow who should 
produce Art much in the way a bootmaker produces boots. By this they mean that he should 
produce the kind of paintings or sculptures they have seen labelled as Art before. One can 
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understand this vague demand, but, alas, it is the one job the artist cannot do. What has 
been done before presents no problem anymore. There is no task in it that could put the 
artist on his mettle. But critics and `highbrows', too, are sometimes guilty of a similar 
misunderstanding. They, too, tell the artist to produce Art; they, too, are inclined to think of 
pictures and statues as specimens for future museums. The only task they set the artist is 
that of creating `something new' - if they had their way, each work would represent a new 
style, a new 'ism'.2 
I believe that this question of the reception of a work of art can 
be considered in parallel to the history of science, and Kuhn can be 
invoked here. The traditional historiography of science, according to Kuhn, values the 
individual scientist whose merits and professional recognition are determined essentially by 
the discoveries (or inventions) associated with his/her name.  Kuhn criticizes this 
conception and proposes a “new historiography” based on the fact that the old one not only 
operates within a dualism of discovery-justification, but also fails to recognize a second 
fundamental type of scientific discovery, which is precisely the most creative and 
revolutionary type, for which it is much more difficult – or even impossible – to attribute 
credit to any given individual.   
I seek to show, in this work, that Kuhn´s conception can be extended to art, given 
the parallels between the history of science and the history of art present in the very origin 
of Kuhnian philosophy of science.  Or more precisely, due to the fact that the history of art 
– at the time he was criticizing the historiography of science for neglecting the change that 
corresponded to the second type of discovery – had already recognized this characteristic 
kind of change.   
In section 2, I present briefly the distinction between the two types of discovery 
proposed by Kuhn.  Section 3 explains the links between the history of science and the 
history of art (using Kuhn and Gombrich), and also establish a limit for the analogy: Kuhn 
and Gombrich agree with respect to the development of art but disagree about science.  I 
conclude in section 4 by outlining an analysis of the issues raised and a few comments that 
I hope will contribute to shed some light on them. 
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2. Kuhn and the two types of scientific discovery  
In well-known passages of Section I of Structure, Kuhn describes the traditional 
historiography of science in these terms: 
If science is the constellation of facts, theories, and methods collected in current texts, then 
scientists are the men who, successfully or not, have striven to contribute one or another 
element to that particular constellation. (…)  And history of science becomes the discipline 
that chronicles both these successive increments and the obstacles that have inhibited their 
accumulation. Concerned with scientific development, the historian then appears to have 
two main tasks. On the one hand, he must determine by what man and at what point in time 
each contemporary scientific fact, law, and theory was discovered or invented. On the 
other, he must describe and explain the congeries of error, myth, and superstition that have 
inhibited the more rapid accumulation of the constituents of the modern science text. Much 
research has been directed to these ends, and some still is.3 
However, Kuhn emphasizes the need for a reaction to this practice:  
In recent years, however, a few historians of science have been finding it more and more 
difficult to fulfill the functions that the concept of development-by-accumulation assigns to 
them. As chroniclers of an incremental process, they discover that additional research 
makes it harder, not easier, to answer questions like: When was oxygen discovered? Who 
first conceived of energy conservation? Increasingly, a few of them suspect that these are 
simply the wrong sorts of questions to ask.4 
Thus, for Kuhn, the result of this reaction was “a historiographic revolution in the 
study of science”.  According to him: 
Gradually (…) historians of science have begun to ask new sorts of questions and to trace 
different, and often less than cumulative, developmental lines for the sciences. Rather than 
seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our present vantage, they attempt 
to display the historical integrity of that science in its own time.5  
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This explanation is complemented by “The historical structure of scientific 
discovery” (1962). In this article, republished in The Essential Tension, Kuhn establishes a 
distinction between two types of discoveries, seeking to point out more precisely how 
difficulties in traditional historiography, to which he refers in Section I of  Structure, 
emerge. 
Kuhn saw no difficulty with the type of discovery, for example, of the neutrino, 
radio waves, or the missing elements in Mendeleev’s periodic table. According to him, the 
existence of these objects “had been predicted from theory before they were discovered, 
and the men who made the discoveries therefore knew from the start what to look for”.6   In 
such cases, therefore, the practice of the “old” traditional historiography would be perfectly 
admissible and feasible. 
Many scientific discoveries, however, “particularly the most interesting and 
important”, as Kuhn stresses, are not of this type, and it would be inappropriate to ask when 
and where they occurred and who was responsible for them. Even if all the relevant 
information were available, he says, “those questions would not regularly possess answers”.  
More complex discoveries of this type include oxygen, electric current, X-rays, and the 
electron, which according to Kuhn “could not be predicted from accepted theory in advance 
and which therefore caught the assembled profession by surprise”. And further on he adds: 
“there is no single moment or day which the historian, however complete his data, can 
identify as the point at which the discovery was made. Often, when several individuals are 
involved, it is even impossible unequivocally to identify any one of them as the 
discoverer”.7 
A passage in Structure allows us to compare directly the two types of discoveries 
considered by Kuhn.  He asks:  “Why could not X-rays have been accepted as just one 
more form of a well-known class of natural phenomena?  Why were they not, for example, 
received in the same way as the discovery of an additional chemical element?”  His answer: 
New elements to fill empty places in the periodic table were still being sought and found in 
Roentgen's day. Their pursuit was a standard project for normal science, and success was an 
                                                 
6
 Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1977, p. 167. 
7
 Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1977, p. 174, my 
emphasis. 
 5
occasion only for congratulations, not for surprise. X-rays, however, were greeted not only 
with surprise but with shock. Lord Kelvin at first pronounced them an elaborate hoax. 
Others, though they could not doubt the evidence, were clearly staggered by it. Though X-
rays were not prohibited by established theory, they violated deeply entrenched expecta-
tions.8 
The discovery of a new element in the periodic table, for example, corresponded to 
a “standard project for normal science”.  Whereas for the second, more complex type, like 
the discovery of X-rays, despite being an accidental discovery, it could, in principle, induce 
a subversion of normal scientific practice, in the same way the discovery of a chemical 
element with unexpected characteristics could lead to an alteration in the periodic table.  As 
Kuhn wrote: 
Previously completed work on normal projects would now have to be done again because 
earlier scientists had failed to recognize and control a relevant variable. X-rays, to be sure, 
opened up a new field and thus added to the potential domain of normal science. But they 
also, and this is now the more important point, changed fields that had already existed. In 
the process they denied previously paradigmatic types of instrumentation their right to that 
title.9 
And it is worth emphasizing, with Kuhn, to complete the comparison between the 
two types of discoveries, that 
discovering a new sort of phenomenon is necessarily a complex event, one which involves 
recognizing both that something is and what it is (...) But if both observation and 
conceptualization, fact and assimilation to theory, are inseparably linked in discovery, then 
discovery is a process and must take time. Only when all the relevant conceptual categories 
are prepared in advance, in which case the phenomenon would not be of a new sort, can 
discovering that and discovering what occur effortlessly, together, and in an instant.10  
Thus, according to this endogenous approach of Kuhn regarding the 
historiographical change, traditional historiography of science was in no condition to 
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respond to the difficulties presented by the second type of discovery in its context, or to be 
practiced according to the cumulativistic proposals that defined it.  It sought to respond to 
two distinct types of discoveries in the same way, as though there were only one type.  The 
change in the new historiography of science would therefore necessarily signify 
overcoming these difficulties or anomalies which emerged in the effective practice of the 
‘old historiography’.11 
In this context, we can understand Kuhn’s role in the new historiography of science, 
from his own perspective.  To begin with, he deliberately avoids posing certain questions 
and seeking certain answers, as traditional historians did, including Koyré. Secondly, Kuhn 
admits, with Koyré, that his theory fills the void between internal and external histories.12  
It is not fitting here to specify what this fusion or this bridge would be, nor is it so 
important at this point in time, when a clear distinction between the genesis and 
justification of knowledge is no longer prescribed.   
I limit myself to remembering that, in an interview published by Borradori13, Kuhn 
goes so far as to say that he would perhaps classify Structure as a work in the sociology of 
knowledge. He certainly emphasizes the importance of studying scientific communities as 
producers and legitimaters of knowledge, with their psychological, sociological, and 
historical differences.  For him, scientific knowledge “is intrinsically a group product” and 
“neither its peculiar efficacy nor the manner in which it develops will be understood 
without reference to the special nature of the groups that produce it”.  In this sense, says 
Kuhn, his work has been deeply sociological, however contradicting the venerable 
distinction between discovery-justification, “not in a way that permits that subject to be 
separated from epistemology”.14   
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In order to clarify the problem of the more complex discovery, which is what is of 
interest to us here, we must consider, along with Kuhn, that “factual and theoretical 
novelty are intertwined in scientific discovery”. He writes: 
We must now ask how changes of this sort can come about, considering first discoveries, 
or novelties of fact, and then inventions, or novelties of theory. That distinction between 
discovery and invention or between fact and theory will, however, immediately prove to 
be exceedingly artificial. Its artificiality is an important clue to several of this essay's main 
theses. (…) Assimilating a new sort of fact demands a more than additive adjustment of 
theory, and until that adjustment is completed --until the scientist has learned to see 
nature in a different way--the new fact is not quite a scientific fact at all.15  
Let us consider this passage together with another already cited above in which 
Kuhn emphasizes that “discovering a new sort of phenomenon is necessarily a complex 
event, one which involves recognizing both that something is and what it is” and that “both 
observation and conceptualization, fact and assimilation to theory, are inseparably linked in 
discovery”.16  The bridge between the question of the discovery of a phenomenon and the 
discovery or invention of a theory can be established through the fact that it is theory that 
will say what the phenomenon discovered is.  In the first type of discovery, as we saw, we 
already have a previous theory.  In the case of the second type, however, a theory has yet to 
be presented to account for the fact – for the anomolous fact that the previous theory allows 
one to know that it is but not what it is.  
 
3. History of science, history of art, and change 
It has been said that Thomas Kuhn`s first sentence in The structure of scientific 
revolutions is “perhaps the most famous sentence in the philosophy of science of the second 
half of the twentieth century”.17  The sentence, it is worth noting, does not refer to the 
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theory of paradigms, the main element in Structure that had such widespread repercussions, 
but rather to history; and it is a methodological observation, in two senses:  it refers to the 
method of the history of science (proposes a change in methods, a new historiography of 
science) and, at the same time, to the method of philosophy of science (proposes a role for 
the new historiography of science in the philosophy of science). 
In the essays published in The Essential Tension, Kuhn develops his famous 
sentence in these two directions, which he calls “Historiographic Studies” and 
“Metahistorical Studies”.  And he begins, as befits a historian, with an autobiographical 
preface in which he emphasizes that the new historiography is not new.  At the moment he 
was proposing it, it was a historiography that was already being practiced in other 
disciplines, such as literature, art, music, and philosophy, and sensitive to conceptual 
ruptures.18 What is important in Kuhn´s work is his controversial extension of this 
historiography to science. Science (particularly physics) was seen until then as being 
characterized by a peculiar cumulative development which vested it with the exclusive 
authority and legitimacy to be associated with progress (and rationality).  
In the “Postscript – 1969”, added to the second edition of his Structure, Kuhn 
commented on the fact that many considered his main theses to be applicable to other fields 
besides physics. He admitted that “to the extent that the book portrays scientific 
development as a succession of tradition-bound periods punctuated by non-cumulative 
breaks, its theses are undoubtedly of wide applicability”. And he wrote: 
But they should be, for they are borrowed from other fields. Historians of literature, of 
music, of the arts, of political development, and of many other human activities have 
long described their subjects in the same way. Periodization in terms of revolutionary 
breaks in style, taste, and institutional structure have been among their standard tools. If I 
have been original with respect to concepts like these, it has mainly been by applying them 
to the sciences, fields which had been widely thought to develop in a different way.19 
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To assess the importance of this transposition to science, one need only consider 
that, for Kuhn, his book on scientific revolutions was a  “belated product” of the “discovery 
of the close and persistent parallels between the two enterprises”, art and science, which he 
had previously seen as polar.  On one side, the world of values, the subjective, the intuitive; 
on the other, the world of facts, the objective, the inductive.  And he refers to the work of 
Gombrich, who Kuhn said, was moving in the same direction and “has been a source of great 
encouragement to me”. 20  
In the same text (“Comment on the relations of science and art”), which is 
specifically about the relation between the two disciplines, but focuses on the differences 
between them, Kuhn writes: 
Elsewhere [in Structure], as Ackerman points out, I have been concerned to emphasize the 
similarity of the evolutionary lines of the two disciplines. In both the historian can discover 
periods during which practice conforms to a tradition based upon one or another stable 
constellation of values, techniques, and models. In both he is also able to isolate periods of 
relatively rapid change in which one tradition and one set of values and models gives way 
to another. That much, however, can probably be said about the development of any human 
enterprise. With respect to gross developmental pattern my originality, if any, was only the 
insistence that what has long been recognized about the development of, say, the arts or 
philosophy applies to science as well.21 
It could be suggested that, as in a feedback process, Kuhn´s thinking arises from 
more intuitive notions of “paradigm” and “incommensurability”, like those found in the 
history of art and other disciplines (as in the idea of style and comparisons among styles).  
He develops them within his philosophy of science and then, at a higher level of 
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conceptualization, they awaken the interest of the disciplines from which they originated, 
and virtually all cultural fields.   
Kuhn discusses the history of art already in at least two earlier drafts of The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, previous to the version so-called Proto-Structure 
(1960). 22 He takes history of art into account at the very Introduction to the book in order 
to establish the supposed contrast between the development of science (cumulative) and 
that of art (non-cumulative) as traditionally conceived, and so presents his conception of 
science as revolutionary or not strictly cumulative. 23 
If the pair cumulative/non-cumulative cannot be understood as yet another element 
of opposition between science and art, it can be understood, however, as opposites that 
characterize the old and the new historiography.  In this way, in the historiographical 
revolution in science that Kuhn addresses directly, and in the historiographical revolution in 
art, what we see is essentially the abandonment of the idea of a continuous cumulative 
progress throughout the history of both disciplines, and of the notion of rationality to which 
it is committed.24  
The new historiography of science will distinguish itself from the old by admitting 
ruptures.  This does not mean denying all continuity, but rather strict cumulativity.  Kuhn is 
clear about this in his “structure” of the development of science, in which normal and 
extraordinary science alternate, and the anomalies that lead to overcoming a theory (or 
paradigm) are born within the theory itself and are guided by it.25  
In an essay in which he refers directly to the question of creativity (the essay that 
gives the title to The Essential Tension, originally published in The Third (1959) University 
of Utah Research Conference on the Identification of Creative Scientific Talent), Kuhn 
speaks for the first time about paradigms, and emphasizes what he calls convergence, 
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disagreeing with most collaborations that emphasize “divergent thinking”.26  But he does 
not fail to observe, as well, that “contrary to a prevalent impression, most new discoveries 
and theories in the sciences are not merely additions to the existing stockpile of scientific 
knowledge”.  And, simultaneously evoking ruptures and continuity, he adds that “only 
investigations firmly rooted in the contemporary scientific tradition are likely to break that 
tradition and give rise to a new one”27.  
This idea of rupture with continuity is also present in Gombrich, who writes in his 
history of art: 
Some form of art exists everywhere on the globe, but the story of art as a continuous effort 
does not begin in the caves of southern France or among the North American Indians. There 
is no direct tradition which links these strange beginnings with our own days, but there is a 
direct tradition, handed down from master to pupil and from pupil to admirer or copyist, 
which links the art of our own days, any house or any poster, with the art of the Nile Valley 
of some five thousand years ago. For we shall see that the Greek masters went to school 
with the Egyptians, and we are all the pupils of the Greeks. Thus the art of Egypt has a 
tremendous importance for us.28  
And he justifies: 
For even the artist who is in revolt against tradition depends on it for that stimulus which 
gives direction to his efforts. It is for this reason that I have tried to tell the story of art as 
the story of a continuous weaving and changing of traditions in which each work refers to 
the past and points to the future. For there is no aspect of this story more wonderful than 
this - that a living chain of tradition still links the art of our own days with that of the 
Pyramid age.29  
Kuhn comments on this aspect of the history of art, saying “Artists, whether in 
imitation or revolt, build from past art”.30  This shows that, for Kuhn as well as Gombrich, 
the idea of cumulative progress signifies a more restricted continuity in which there is no 
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conflict.  In both cases, however, a less restrictive continuity is allowed, in which conflict, 
revolt, or rupture is present. 
A distinction must be established to avoid misunderstandings.  In the same work 
cited immediately above, Gombrich appears to deny this continuity as he denies a 
“continuous progress”, but he rejects, in fact, what could be called, in Kuhn´s terms, 
continuous cumulative progress.  Gombrich writes: 
Each generation is at some point in revolt against the standards of its fathers; (…) I have 
tried to make this constant change of aims the key of my narrative, and to show how each 
work is related by imitation or contradiction to what has gone before. (…) There is one 
pitfall in this method of presentation which I hope to have avoided but which should not go 
unmentioned. It is the naïve misinterpretation of the constant change in art as a continuous 
progress. It is true that every artist feels that he has surpassed the generation before him and 
that from his point of view he has made progress beyond anything that was known before. 
(…) But we must realize that each gain or progress in one direction entails a loss in another, 
and that this subjective progress, in spite of its importance, does not correspond to an 
objective increase in artistic value.31 
This accounting assessment, in terms of gains and losses, also allows Gombrich to 
explain what appear to him to be the differences between science and art.  He writes in an 
initial pertinent passage: 
While these [Mantegna and Piero della Francesca] and other artists were applying the 
inventions of the great generation of Florentine masters, artists in Florence became 
increasingly aware of the new problems that these inventions had created. In the first flush 
of triumph, they may have thought that the discovery of perspective and the study of nature 
could solve all their difficulties. But we must not forget that art is altogether different from 
science. The artist's means, his technical devices, can be developed, but art itself can hardly 
be said to progress in the way in which science progresses. Each discovery in one direction 
creates a new difficulty somewhere else.32  
And he understands the gains and losses in the following terms: 
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We remember that medieval painters were unaware of the rules of correct draughtsmanship, 
but that this very shortcoming enabled them to distribute their figures over the picture in 
any way they liked in order to create the perfect pattern. (…) As soon as the new concept of 
making the picture a mirror of reality was adopted, this question of how to arrange the 
figures was no longer so easy to solve. In reality figures do not group themselves 
harmoniously, nor do they stand out clearly against a neutral background. In other words, 
there was a danger that the new power of the artist would ruin his most precious gift of 
creating a pleasing and satisfying whole.33  
And at the end of the book, referring back to the preceding passage and to another 
in which he cites Cézanne´s art as a “synthesis” between fidelity to nature and formal 
balance, Gombrich concludes: 
And yet it is more than ever necessary to remember that art differs from science and 
technology. It is true that the history of art can sometimes trace the steps in the solution of 
certain artistic problems, and this book has tried to make these intelligible. But it has also 
tried to show that in art we cannot speak of ‘progress’ as such, because every gain in one 
respect is likely to be offset by a loss in another.34   
Perhaps to emphasize the difference between science and art, Gombrich does not 
explicitly recognize in these passages (as he does in various other writings) that one can 
also speak of cumulative progress in art.  After all, unlike some “highbrows”, as he calls 
them, Gombrich does not expect that every work of art, to be creative, should create a new 
style.35 With regard to this, Kuhn refers precisely to Gombrich36 when he writes about “the 
inextricable connections between our notions of science and of progress”:  
For many centuries, both in antiquity and again in early modern Europe, painting was 
regarded as the cumulative discipline. During those years the artist's goal was assumed 
to be representation. Critics and historians, like Pliny and Vasari, then recorded with 
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veneration the series of inventions from foreshortening through chiaroscuro that had 
made possible successively more perfect representations of nature. But those are also 
the years, particularly during the Renaissance, when little cleavage was felt between the 
sciences and the arts. Leonardo was only one of many men who passed freely back and 
forth between fields that only later became categorically distinct. Furthermore, even 
after that steady exchange had ceased, the term ‘art’ continued to apply as much to 
technology and the crafts, which were also seen as progressive, as to painting and 
sculpture. Only when the latter unequivocally renounced representation as their goal and 
began to learn again from primitive models did the cleavage we now take for granted 
assume anything like its present depth.37 
Thus, we can say that Kuhn and Gombrich agree with respect to the development of 
art but disagree about science.  Gombrich said that art and science are entirely different 
because science always presents cumulative progress, or “progress as such”.  Whereas for 
Kuhn, the development of science can be better understood if seen in closer proximity to 
the development of art, or more precisely, to the development of art as understood by 
Gombrich.  This difference between Gombrich and Kuhn can be clearly observed in 
Gombrich´s references to Kuhn.  Gombrich wrote, in “Relativism in the history of ideas”: 
I have learned enough from another friend, Sir Karl Popper, not to dismiss human error as 
something culpable or even useless. I have been told that students of science often refuse to 
be interested in the history of their subject since they regard it simply as the history of 
errors which no longer concern us. You surely cannot write the history of ideas if you adopt 
such a negative attitude, but you cannot do so either, I want to contend, if you eliminate the 
notion of error altogether and adopt a wholly relativistic stance. I suspect it was Thomas 
Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolution [sic] (1963) [sic], which appealed to 
the tender conscience of historians by warning them not to feel superior over past centuries 
and past ideas, though I have heard Kuhn say explicitly that he too believes in the progress 
of knowledge.38 
And he finishes with a note:  
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When I gave the lecture ‘Focus on the Humanities’ printed in Tributes (…), Professor Kuhn 
subsequently criticized my statement that he did not believe in progress, and I added a 
footnote to this effect. In a series of lectures at University College, London, entitled ‘The 
Presence of Past Science’ (November 1987), Professor Kuhn questioned the usefulness of 
the term ‘relativism’, but reasserted his belief in the progress of science.39 
Finally, Gombrich makes the following mention of Kuhn in Tributes: “In this 
balance of optimism and resignation the humanist does not differ from the scientist, who 
also knows that there is no such thing as an ultimate explanation but believes – if he 
follows Popper rather than Kuhn – that he can make progress in suggesting better 
solutions”. And he adds in a note: “In a subsequent discussion, Thomas Kuhn remarked 
that he also acknowledges the possibility of scientific progress”.40 These passages indicate 
that Gombrich suspected that Kuhn did not admit progress in science, as Kuhn identifies a 
succession of ruptures in the development of science.  As for Gombrich, he is ready to 
admit such ruptures in art, but categorically refuses to do so in the case of science. 
Kuhn is attracted to Gombrich´s conception of the history of art precisely because 
Gombrich does admit ruptures in the history of art, whereas traditional historians of 
science, according to Kuhn, do not admit ruptures in the history of science.41  In addition to 
the texts cited above, Gombrich writes, for example, in The Story of Art, that 
It is fascinating to watch an artist thus striving to achieve the right balance, but if we were 
to ask him why he did this or changed that, he might not be able to tell us. He does not 
follow any fixed rules. He just feels his way. It is true that some artists or critics in certain 
periods have tried to formulate laws of their art; but it always turned out that poor artists did 
not achieve anything when trying to apply these laws, while great masters could break them 
and yet achieve a new kind of harmony no one had thought of before.42  
In Norm and Form, he comments on the role of rules and proposes an endogenous 
explanation for historical overcoming of classical art: 
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It was the classical tradition of normative aesthetics that first formulated some rules of art, 
and such rules are most easily formulated negatively as a catalogue of sins to be avoided. 
(…) We have heard some of these sins characterized in the previous quotations -- the 
disharmonious, the arbitrary and the illogical must be taboo to those who follow the 
classical canon. There are many more in the writings of normative critics from Alberti via 
Vasari to Bellori or Félibien. (…) Indeed it might be argued that what ultimately killed the 
classical ideal was that the sins to be avoided multiplied till the artist's freedom was 
confined to an ever narrowing space; all he dared to do in the end was insipid repetition of 
safe solutions. After this, there was only one sin to be avoided in art, that of being 
academic.43 
 
4. Final considerations 
When we consider all that has been said here regarding continuity and discontinuity, 
the paradoxical nature of an expression like “rupture with continuity” stands out.   But in 
order to adequately understand the relations between continuity and discontinuity, and 
between these and creativity, in science and art, it is necessary to consider that the idea of 
continuity with cumulativity is also paradoxical. This is because continuity, strictly 
speaking, means that there is no change, whereas cumulativity represents a change as well, 
even if merely due to additions.  Thus, we can think of three types of continuity:  strict 
continuity, continuity with cumulativity, and continuity with rupture.  In the first, the 
expression indicates only that there is no change, or more precisely, that there is no change 
over time, or that things remain the same over a period of time.  In the second case, of 
continuity with cumulativity, there is a change, but something also remains permanent over 
time.  But what remains permanent?  
In the case of science, Kuhn says, it is the accepted theory (or paradigm) that 
remains and the set of achievements, discoveries, and solutions to problems associated with 
and guided by that theory.  And new discoveries or solutions to problems are added to this 
set of accomplishments like a new chemical element is added to the periodic table.  In the 
case of art, what remains are proposals of style and the effective achievement of its 
practice, a set of works of art, to which are added new works of art informed by the same 
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style. They could be more explicit achievements related to realistic representation of nature 
(such as the technical achievements in the evolution of Greek art cited by Gombrich)44, or 
less explicit ones, such as the addition of Monet´s last painting in the series on the Rouen 
cathedral.   
No problem up to this point.  But what about the third case we are considering?  In 
this case, we no longer have the permanence alluded to in the preceding case.  In science, 
there is a change in theory or paradigm, and in art, a change in style.  So what, then, 
remains? 
Kuhn and Gombrich, as we have seen, speak of a continuity with and without 
rupture.  Kuhn conceives of the change in paradigms in science as endogenous, with a new 
paradigm emerging from an anomaly that stands out against the backdrop of the old 
paradigm.45 In what concerns to art, Gombrich says that “each work is related by imitation 
or contradiction to what has gone before”46 and Kuhn that artists build from past art 
“whether in imitation or revolt”.47   
Gombrich emphasizes the fact that there is history only with continuity.  One could 
point to the drawings found in the caves at Altamira and Lascaux (the so-called rupestrian 
art) as a point of origin of art, but Gombrich disregards it because continuity cannot be 
established between this point  and, say, Egyptian art.  This possibility does exist, however, 
with respect to Egyptian or Assyrian art and contemporary art, and therefore he begins his 
narrative in Egypt and Assyria.48   
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What Gombrich denies here is the existence of historical continuity, as there is an 
evident logical continuity between rupestrian art and Greek art.  Gombrich considers the 
Greek revolution to be “unique in the annals of mankind”, although he admits pre-Greek 
examples (or outside of Greek influence) that imitate nature, such as ancient Mexican art, 
Egyptian art, and even rupestrian art.  Nevertheless, he considers them isolated cases that 
did not become part of a new tradition, unlike what occurred in Greece, with its proposals 
for perfection and propagation. 49  
 Would the same be true for Kuhn with respect to science?  Paul Hoyningen-Huene, 
contesting the notion that incommensurability implies discontinuity, points to clear 
references to continuity in Kuhn´s work, such as the following description of what remains 
following a scientific revolution: “much of [the scientist's] language and most of his 
laboratory instruments are the same as they were before. As a result, postrevolutionary 
science invariably includes many of the same manipulations, performed with the same 
instruments and described in the same terms as its revolutionary predecessor”.50 
Hoyningen-Huene comments, however, that “Kuhn isn't satisfied with his previous 
treatment of the continuities persisting through revolutions. The reason for this 
dissatisfaction is doubtless that, although he attested to these continuities, he didn't analyze 
them in any depth”.51 
In order to sketch a theoretical link to Gombrich, I call attention to a suggestive 
observation made by Kuhn. It is an economical suggestion and made in passing, when he 
contrasts the typical work of translators with the translation work engaged in by science 
historians and scientists when they compare two rival scientific theories.  Regarding the 
latter, he writes: “They often have the inestimable advantage that the signs used in the two 
languages are identical or nearly so, that most of them function the same way in both 
languages, and that, where function has changed, there are nevertheless informative reasons 
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for retaining the same sign”.52 And the same signs are maintained, although this identity 
can be misleading, creating false cognates or making it “excessively easy to ignore 
functional changes that would be apparent if they had been accompanied by a change of 
sign”.53 What might be these “informative reasons”, vested with so much prestige that they 
take precedence over clarity itself?  
Speaking of ‘ways of worldmaking’, Goodman writes:  
Facts, as Norwood Hanson says, are theory-laden; they are as theory-laden as we hope our 
theories are fact-laden. Or in other words, facts are small theories, and true theories are big 
facts. This does not mean, I must repeat, that right versions can be arrived at casually, or 
that worlds are built from scratch. We start, on any occasion, with some old version or 
world that we have on hand and that we are stuck with until we have the determination and 
skill to remake it into a new one. Some of the felt stubbornness of fact is the grip of habit: 
our firm foundation is indeed solid. Worldmaking begins with one version and ends with 
another.54   
The ascendancy-descendancy relation pointed out here by Goodman is also 
recognized by Toulmin, who asks: “What makes the later phases of a science the 
‘legitimate heirs’ of the earlier? These different phases are linked, neither by identities nor 
by logical entailments, but by relationships of legitimate ancestry and affiliation; and our 
problem is to discover how their legitimacy can be explained”.  And he adds in a note: “Cf. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's reply to critics who complained that what he was doing was ‘not 
philosophy’, which was to answer, ‘Maybe not, but what I am doing is the legitimate heir to 
that which has previously been called philosophy’”.55   
It can thus be said that the identity of the sign, like a family name, indicates its 
historical relation of ascendancy-descendancy in science.  Kuhn clearly admits this relation.  
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For him, as we saw, the new theory or paradigm emerges based on the old in response to 
anomalies that discredit the latter.56 He writes: 
The Copernican universe is itself the product of a series of investigations that the two-
sphere universe made possible: the conception of a planetary earth is the most forceful 
illustration of the effective guidance given to science by the incompatible conception of a 
unique central earth. That is why a discussion of the Copernican Revolution must begin 
with a study of the two-sphere cosmology which Copernicanism ultimately made obsolete. 
The two-sphere universe is the parent of the Copernican; no conceptual scheme is born 
from nothing.57 
Thus, it may be possible to consider an inter-theoretical competition in science 
without identity of object. And this continuity with rupture, this historical continuity that is 
not established through identity or logical implications, as Toulmin points out, would be 
stressed by an identity of sign. These would be the “informative reasons” Kuhn referred to 
for retaining the same sign. 
 
 If we return now to Gauguin, to our starting point, we can say that he illustrates 
very well the question regarding creativity and the idea of continuity and discontinuity in 
the realm of science as well as art.  In the terms of the above analysis, Gauguin’s sentence 
can be understood literally, without irony, as if it were part of a text (or context) belonging 
to Kuhn or Gombrich.  Both, as we saw, allow for ruptures, but ruptures with continuity. 
On the other hand, as a boutade, the sentence is paradoxical and accounts for the 
fact that the public demands originality, but a clear, immediately understandable and 
acceptable originality, which appears to negate originality. As though the public expects 
creativity, but not so much that the result might lie beyond their reach. . .  
Gauguin´s spirited comment survives the analysis because the idea of rupture with 
continuity is itself (apparently) paradoxical.  In addition, it is always difficult to cope with 
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the really new, which tends to be received, clearly or confusedly, in terms of the old.  With 
respect to this, we saw how, according to Gombrich, it is expected that the artist “should 
produce the kind of paintings or sculptures they have seen labelled as Art before”.58  
However, in the history of science as well in the history of art, in the face of a true novelty 
(discovery of the second type), it must be resolved simultaneously what the new 
phenomenon is, and what is science or what is art.  The novelty can induce a change in the 
very conception of what is science, or what is art. 
This is not an individual task, but an attribution to the scientific community and the 
artistic community (Kuhn speaks of a “community of artists”).  And this is a question to be 
solved in extremis, because at the same time, the communities themselves (their 
composition and their very reason for being) are also at stake.  In the face of a scenario that 
could be radical, it can be understood how a thread of continuity is important, after all. 
There goeth Theseus into the labyrinth.   
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